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What are the main causes of international terrorism? The lessons from the surge of academic 
research that followed 9/11 remain elusive. The careful investigation of the relative roles of 
economic and political conditions did little to change the fact that existing econometric 
estimates diverge in size, sign and significance. In this paper we present a new rationale (the 
escalation effect) stressing domestic political instability as the main reason for international 
terrorism. Econometric evidence from a panel of more than 130 countries (yearly from 1968 
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The best political weapon is the weapon of terror. Cruelty 
commands respect. Men may hate us. But, we don't ask for their 
love; only for their fear.  
 
            Himmler 
 
 
To be feared is to fear: no one has been able to strike terror into 






Terrorism is defined as premeditated political violence against civilians with the objective of 
maximizing media exposure to the act and, ultimately, to the terror group and/or to its “cause.”
1 
Because it targets non-military personnel (that is, because the focus of terrorist activities are 
“civilians” or “non-combatants”), terrorist acts fundamentally differ from civil wars, guerrilla 
warfare and riots. Because the aim is to raise the profile of the “cause,” one main objective of 
terrorism is to maximize media exposure so as to further the atmosphere of fear. As the relative 
importance  of  exposure  vis-à-vis  the  terror  act  itself  increases  (the  propaganda  eclipsing  the 
deed), the technical and planning aspects become relatively more important.  
 Although the events of 9/11 generated a surge of academic research on the causes of 
terrorism, the main lessons from this research remain elusive. There is no doubt we learned a lot 
in recent years about the aggregate behaviour of terrorism over time, about its economic and 
political  costs  and  about  its  microeconomic  motives,  but  considerable  disagreement  remains 
                                                 
1 The definition we use in this paper is from Krueger and Maleckova (2003, p. 120): “terrorism means 
premeditated,  politically  motivated  violence  perpetrated  against  noncombatant  targets  by  subnational 
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term ‘international terrorism’ 
means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.”     2 
about its root causes.
2 This literature has produced a careful and detailed investigation of the 
relative roles of economic conditions (GDP levels and rates, poverty, income inequality), political 
rights and democracy (examining linear and non-linear effects) and interstate violent conflicts, 
among other lesser factors. However, the empirical estimates diverge harshly in size, statistical 
significance and even sign. More importantly, this literature has by and large downplayed the role 
of  domestic  political  instability.  Is domestic  political  instability  a  root  cause  of  international 
terrorism?  Here  we introduce  the  escalation  effect  arguing  that  it is indeed  a  main  cause  of 
international terrorism.  
There are three aspects of our paper that we think constitute important differences vis-à-
vis previous studies. One is that domestic instability is explicitly considered as one main reason 
for international terrorism. The second is that we use different types of political instability (to 
identify the escalation effect), as well as different indicators of international terrorism (that reflect 
the number of terror acts as well as their severity). And a third difference refers to the policy 
implications, which diverge from current policy prescriptions in general and, in particular, from 
the dominant (especially among non-economists) “failed states” perspective.  
One  self-imposed  restriction  we  must  explain  up-front  is  that  we  focus  solely  on 
international terrorism (that is, we exclude domestic terrorism from our analysis). International 
terrorism is defined as terrorist acts involving citizens and/or territory of more than one country. 
One main reason for this focus is that it “stacks the cards” against the escalation effect. We claim 
that  domestic  political  instability  drives  international  terrorism.  Naturally,  if  these  spillover 
effects are substantial, they will be larger on domestic than on international terrorism. One reason 
for this is that civil wars and guerrilla warfare may (although not necessarily do) involve acts of 
                                                 
2 The thorough literature review by Llussá and Tavares (2008) finds that “comprehensive studies that 
address the long-run determinants of terrorism are scarce.” We summarize this body of literature in Table 
1 below and discuss it in Section 2.   3 
domestic  terrorism.  If  this  is  correct,  the  effects  we  estimate  for,  say  civil  wars,  risk  being 
substantially  larger  for  domestic  than  for  international  terrorism.
3  Hence,  focusing  on 
international terrorism provides conservative estimates of the roles of different forms of domestic 
political instability.  
What are the stylized facts of international terrorism? Figures 1 to 5 show our data, across 
regions and from 1968 to 2004, in two important dimensions: the total number of terrorist events 
and their total number of fatalities. The main stylized fact is that although there have been on 
average a decreasing number of terror attacks per year, the average number of deaths they have 
caused has systematically increased over the last 40 years or so.
4 Moreover, there are important 
regional differences: e.g., lethality increased across all regions since at least 2000, except Sub-
Saharan Africa. In terms of the total numbers, our data shows that most attacks took place in the 
Middle East and Europe, while the most lethal attacks were in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. 
  Using data on various aspects of international terrorism (namely, total number of terror 
acts, total fatalities, and median fatalities) covering more than 130 countries, yearly from 1968 
until 2003,
5 our main findings are that (1) civil wars and guerrilla warfare are robustly associated 
with various aspects of international terrorism, while riots and strikes are not, and this association 
is  even  stronger  for  fatalities  than  for  the  number  of  attacks,
  (2)  the  explanatory  power  of 
escalation does not seem to decrease over time,
 (3)  per capita GDP, population size and foreign 
aid  are  found  not  to  be  consistently  important  in  explaining  international  terrorism,  and  (4) 
                                                 
3 Unsurprisingly, we find that the effect of the domestic political instability variables is substantially larger 
when  accounting  for  both  domestic  and  international  terrorism.  This  is  despite  international  terrorist 
events being a fraction of the total number of terrorist attacks. For example, “for the year 2003, the MIPT 
Terrorism  Knowledge  Base  reports  1,536  events  of  domestic  terrorism,  but  only  240  events  of 
international terrorism” (Abadie, 2006). Another reason is that the data series for domestic terrorism starts 
much later (for instance, in our data set it starts only in 1998) which would further constrain the analysis.  
4 This is unaffected by the exclusion of the 9/11 attacks, one of the most lethal attacks in history.  
5 The Freedom House democracy indices start in 1972. Using Polity IV measures instead (which contains 
data from 1968 onwards) does not affect our results.     4 
proximity to the U.S. matters (measured as the share of votes cast in the United Nations General 
Assembly that are in line with the U.S. vote). 
What are the mechanisms through which the escalation effect may operate? Although the 
difficulties  in  disentangling  such  mechanisms  are  well-known,  we  conjecture  that  the  main 
mechanism at work has to do with learning-by-doing and the accumulation of terrorist human 
capital. Terror requires schooling and sophisticated training. Politically unstable countries offer 
propitious conditions. It has been correctly noted that terrorist groups operate human resources 
policies  which  favour  better  educated  or  economically  better-off  individuals  (Krueger  and 
Maleckova, 2003). A related aspect that has received less attention is that the human capital 
required for terrorism is specific and involves a complex mix of skills which are costly to acquire 
and maintain.
6 Terrorist skills have a high rate of obsolescence and are not easily transferable 
across  occupations.  Moreover,  certain  forms  of  domestic  political  instability  (say,  guerrilla 
warfare  and  civil  war)  provide  for  the  honing  of  military,  tactical,  and  organizational  skills 
needed  to  carry  out  terrorist  acts,  while  other  forms  (such  as  riots,  anti-government 
demonstrations  and strikes) should not provide for the same level or types of skills.
  
    The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we elaborate on the escalation effect and 
contrast it with other available explanations. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and 
the data we use. Section 4 discusses our econometric estimates and the various robustness tests to 
which they were subjected. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
6 Training may turn out to be the major component of the costs of a terrorist operation: “Very cheap 
terrorist attacks can create significant anxiety – the material cost of a suicide attack may be as little as 
$150 and on average kills twelve people” (Sandler et al., 2008, p. 3).    5 
2. The Escalation Effect as an Alternative Explanation 
In this section, we answer the following questions: what are the main reasons that have been 
identified for international terrorism across countries and over time? And what are the strengths 
and weaknesses of these different explanations?   
The body of evidence we are most concerned with is the set of quantitative studies whose 
objective is to identify the main or deep causes of international terrorism across large samples of 
countries and over time.
7 Such studies have a common aim which is to uncover broad regularities 
as their ultimate goal is to offer evidence-backed policy recommendations. More specifically, the 
body of evidence we focus on are those 27 papers summarized in Table 1. This table includes 
most (but surely not all) existing econometric work on the causes of international terrorism. 
What does this evidence show? First, it is much smaller than one might have expected, 
inter alia for the 9/11 events. Second, the cross-country coverage is extensive, ranging from 71 to 
193 countries (thus most studies pool developing and developed countries). Third, there are still 
quite a large number of papers that only report cross-sectional estimates which may be worrisome 
because, as we can see from Figures 1 to 5, there have been fluctuations in international terrorism 
and choosing a point in time, or a short period, to examine the causes of terror will likely produce 
biased  results.  Fourth,  a  large  number  of  studies  (12  out  of  27)  report  negative  binomial 
estimates, which is the appropriate econometric methodology for the issues at hand. Fifth, and 
finally, the source of the data used in the majority of studies is ITERATE or MIPT (Enders 
2007), with most using the number of terror attacks as the main terrorism indicator and about half 
focusing on target as opposed to origin countries. Notice that here we use the total number of 
international terrorist attacks, but we go beyond this by also reporting estimates based on their 
                                                 
7  Although  a  comprehensive  review  of  the  economic  literature  on  terrorism,  including  measurement 
issues, causes, consequences and economic costs is beyond the scope of this paper (as our focus is on its 
causes), it can be found in Enders (2007),  Frey et al. (2007), and Llussá and Tavares (2008).    6 
severity (measured as the number of fatalities). Further, we also use the target and not the origin 
definition  because  their  measurement  is  less  error-prone.  Such  errors  arise  from  trying  to 
establish the nationality of the terrorists/groups involved, so it is not surprising to find that the 
data availability for terror acts according to origin is considerably worse than that according to 
target (indeed, in the MIPT dataset only for one-third of all terrorist acts the perpetrators are 
known). Moreover, the nationality often says little about who funded, planned and organized the 
attack. In light of the escalation effect, this choice also generates more conservative estimates. An 
attack involving various nationalities, like 9/11, is counted as one event in the target country 
while it is counted as one event for each terrorist in each of the origin countries inflating the 
global number of events.  
What can we learn from these studies? What are the main causes of international terrorism 
according to this body of empirical evidence? The literature highlights various reasons for terror: 
democracy, poverty, size, and conflict. We discuss each of these in turn.  
One first deep cause of international terrorism  according to the empirical literature is 
democracy. The intuition is that societies lacking democratic liberties constrain political protest 
into  clandestine  and  often  violent  forms,  among  them  terrorism.  There  are  a  few  important 
qualifications to this story, such as the notion of a non-linear relationship between political rights 
and terror, that political rights seem more closely associated with terrorism than civil liberties, 
and the finding that freedom of press does not seem to play as major a role as other political 
considerations.  As  noted,  existing  estimates  diverge  in  size,  significance  and  sign  so 
discrepancies  with  respect  to  the  role  of  democracy  are  not  the  exception,  but  the  rule.  For 
instance,  while  Abadie  (2006)  finds  that  political  rights  are  a  crucial  factor,  Tavares  (2004) 
argues otherwise. 
A  second  reason  for  international  terrorism  highlighted  by  the  empirical  literature  is   7 
poverty (low levels of per capita GDP). This has been a very contentious issue. Different studies 
have examined different aspects such as levels of per capita GDP, growth rates, and the role of 
recessions (Gini coefficients, the Human Development Index, as well as various measures of 
government expenditures on health and education and foreign aid inflows have also been used.) 
Again,  there  are  papers  showing  per  capita  GDP  or  growth  rates  of  GDP  to  be  important 
determinants of international terrorism (e.g., Blomberg et al., 2004), and papers reporting that 
these are not important determinants (e.g., Krueger and Maleckova, 2003). Burgoon (2006) and 
Azam  and  Thelen  (2008)  show  that  government  expenditures  (on  health  and  education)  and 
foreign aid, respectively, tend to reduce the incidence of terrorist attacks. 
 A third commonly investigated reason is country size, often measured as total population 
and/or as percentage of the total population living in urban areas. The justification is that larger 
fractions of population in urban centres make terror attacks more deadly, all else equal. Table 1 
show that most papers incorporate population and find that it is an important determinant of 
terrorist events, with few papers finding that it is not relevant.  
 One last important reason for international terrorism found in the empirical literature is 
conflict. Various studies examine the role of interstate conflicts, wars, and regime durability on 
the occurrence of international terrorism. Some find that whether a country has participated in a 
war matters, others find that it is not important vis-à-vis international terrorism (e.g., Lai, 2007, 
and Burgoon, 2006, respectively).  
Because our focus is on the role of violent domestic conflict, we discuss in detail the only 
three  studies  we  find  (out  of  27)  which  use  domestic  political  instability  as  a  correlate  of 
international terrorism. These are Li (2005), Lai (2007) and Krueger and Laitin (2008).  Li (2005) 
shows that less durable regimes tend to attract more international terrorism. Yet, not only is there 
no justification for this inclusion (other than “the variable is too important to exclude,” Li, 2005,   8 
p. 286) but the coefficient on regime durability is neither mentioned nor discussed anywhere in 
the paper. Lai (2007) presents results for the role of civil wars in explaining terrorism, but the 
justification and interpretation of the domestic instability effect differ. Lai (2007) justifies the use 
of civil wars as an explanatory variable as a proxy of “state failure.”
 8 The hypothesis is that the 
“number of terrorist incidents originating from a state is likely to be higher as the operating costs 
within that state decrease” (Lai, 2007, p. 300), with five variables used to proxy for those costs 
(including civil war, inter-state wars and telephone lines). Krueger and Laitin (2008) also use 
domestic political  instability  variables  to  explain international  terrorism.  They  find  that  “fast 
growing, stable countries are more likely to be the origin and target of suicide attacks,” where 
political stability is a dummy variable capturing whether or not the country is stable (from the 
World Bank’s Governance Matters dataset). There are two important differences vis-à-vis our 
hypothesis: one is that this finding is restricted to suicide bombings, and the second is that it 
implies that instability actually reduces terrorism.
  
This brief review of the literature lead us to conclude (a) that the low levels of political 
development and the low levels of economic development seem to be  the two main reasons 
studied  in  the  empirical  literature,  and  (b)  that  this  literature  has  by  and  large  ignored  the 
importance of the escalation process and the attendant role of domestic political instability for the 
propagation of international terrorism.  
One explanation that combines political and economic development reasons, namely the 
“failed states hypothesis,” seems now dominant in policy and political science circles (although 
not, as the review above makes clear, in the economics discussion). The idea is simple: weak 
                                                 
8 “Governments involved in a civil war are not likely to have the resources available to effectively control 
their territory, allowing groups to organize without fear of government reprisals… In addition to a civil 
war, states involved in an interstate war are also likely to have less ability to control their own borders. 
Similar to the effects of involvement in a civil war, interstate conflict can potentially create a situation 
where a government’s resources are unavailable to address internal problems” (Lai, 2007, p. 302).     9 
states produce international terrorists. As synthesized in the opening sentence of the Brookings 
Institution’s Annual Report on Weak States: “Since September 11, 2001, the United States and 
other governments have frequently asserted that threats to international peace and security often 
come from the world’s weakest states” (Rice and Patrick, 2008, p.3). 
But what exactly are weak or failed states? The Brookings index is a composite of 20 
indicators (5 in each of four “baskets”: economic, political, security and social welfare). Under 
security one finds incidence of coups, territory affected by conflict, political stability, human 
rights abuses and conflict intensity.
9 Thus, countries in which there is domestic or international 
terrorism are more likely (everything else the same) to be classified as weak states.
10  
The  shortcomings  we  see  in the  “failed states view  as  a  major  cause  of  international 
terrorism”  should  now  be  clear.  The  failed  states hypothesis  is  basically  unfalsifiable:  failed 
states produce terrorism because they are weak states and their weakness shows in their inability 
to contain terrorism. From a different and more policy-oriented perspective, this hypothesis lacks 
predictive power: we can not identify well which states are weak before a terror attack occurs 
because states will be classified as weak inter alia by the occurrence of terror.
11 Further, the 
“failed  states  view”  does  not  resolve  the  debate  (by  combining  economic  and  political 
development concerns), it simply delays it by making it harder to disentangle their relative roles. 
Finally, it is unsurprising that empirically  a composite index that includes the occurrence of 
terrorism does a good job in explaining terrorism across countries and over time.  
In this paper we introduce the escalation effect. It basically posits that domestic political 
                                                 
9  See Rice and Patrick (2008) for a detailed discussion of each of these components and “baskets.” They 
also  provide  an  excellent  review  of  various  other  indexes  of  state  failure.  We  should  note  that  our 
contention is exclusively with state failure as a cause of international terrorism as we view state failure as 
a very useful concept in other contexts. 
10 See also Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index (Foreign Policy, 2008).  
11 Both the mechanisms through which political instability can economically “weaken” a state and whether 
or not this weakening actually takes place are still unclear (Campos and Nugent, 2002).   10 
instability  is  a  deep  cause  of  international  terrorism,  across  countries  and  over  time.  Our 
argument is that domestic political instability has a first-order effect on the production of terrorist 
attacks, while the various alternative explanations (mainly, low levels of political and economic 
development) offered in the literature do not exhibit such first-order effects. More specifically, 
we formulate this hypothesis as follows: 
(1)  domestic  political  instability  is  a  main  or  deep  cause  of  international  terrorism 
because  terrorism  requires  skills  (mostly  military  and  organizational)  that  can  be 
honed  in  countries  that  are  politically  unstable  or  have  experienced  political 
instability;  
(2)  terror  skills  are  easily  acquired  under  severe  political  instability  (for  example,  in 
guerrilla warfare, civil wars and armed revolutions conditions), but are not easily 
acquired  under  other  forms  of  domestic  political  instability  (such  as  riots,  anti-
government demonstrations and general strikes); 
(3)  the escalation effect is independent from state-sponsored terrorism so that the end of 
the Cold War allow us to assess its significance in that we should expect that the 
importance of domestic political does not decrease over time and, in particular, does 
not decrease after 1989 (see O’Kane, 2007 on state-sponsored terrorism);  and 
(4)  if such skills do indeed accumulate across countries and over time one shall expect 
that the severity of terror attacks (which is usually proxied by the number of resulting 
casualties) will increase over time even if the numbers of attacks do not. 
  Because  our  objective  is  to  present  the  escalation  effect  as  a  worthwhile  alternative 
explanation, we have to show that it holds across countries and over time (i.e., that it does not 
lack  generality).  Consequently,  we  must  use  macro  data  at  the  country-level  on  the  terrorist 
attacks as well as on the various alternative explanations that have been offered. Yet, we are   11 
aware that the mechanism we favour (based on skills acquisition and the importance of training) 
can not be fully identified using this type of data. We present two main arguments in defence of 
this mechanism, one based on anecdotal evidence and the other on our identification strategy. 
The  first  argument  is  based  on  the  large  body  of  more  anecdotal  evidence  on  the 
importance of training for international terrorism. Smith (2008) reviews a number of case studies 
and  concludes  that  the  “cases  of  McVeigh,  the  Sept.  11  hijackers  and  Rudolph  are  actually 
unusual. In fact, we found that most terrorists live close to their selected targets, and they engage 
in a great deal of preparation — some over the course of months or even years — that has the 
potential of coming to the attention of local law enforcement… Comparing the 10 international 
terrorist incidents that occurred on American soil, we found that the average planning cycle for 
international terrorists was 92 days, as opposed to 14 days for environmental terrorists.” (Smith, 
2008, p. 3-5). Chivers and Rohde (2002) provide a detailed discussion of what and how terrorist 
training involves based on training manuals from various terrorists groups across the globe. They 
report on the vast array of skills embodied in what they call the “core curriculum,” skills such as 
casing  and  targeting,  planning  and  finances,  codes  and  secure  communication,  map  reading, 
celestial and advanced land navigation, demolition techniques, first aid, internal security, combat 
techniques,  manufacturing  of  bombs  and  improvised  explosive  devices,  use  of  firearms  and 
weapons (such as Kalashnikov and M16 rifles, PK machine guns, 82-milimiter mortars, shoulder-
fired rockets and portable anti-aircraft missiles), assassination techniques as well as escape and 
evasion  tactics  (the  latter  including  methods  for  resisting  interrogation).  It  is  also  worth 
mentioning  that  Chivers  and  Rohde  (2002)  interviewed  various  military  instructors  whom 
expressed surprise not only with the depth and range of the skills being taught, but even more so 
with how the curriculum has been carefully put together, in independent modules or packages. 
The second argument we present for favouring the skills mechanism rests on our layered   12 
identification strategy. We argue that guerrilla warfare and civil wars (and, to a lesser extent, 
riots)  are  forms  of  domestic  instability  which  provide  the  skills  —  military,  tactical,  and 
organizational  —  required  to  carry  out  international  terrorist  acts  across  the  globe.  Equally 
importantly, we also hypothesize that demonstrations and strikes play much smaller roles because 
they are non-violent forms of domestic instability and, therefore, do not support the acquisition of 
the key skills necessary for international terrorism attacks. A second layer we provide is that we 
also argue that the importance of the escalation effect has increased over time and this is despite 
the fact that state sponsored terrorism has become much less prevalent since the end of the Cold 
War,
  thereby  curtailing  foreign-supported  training  opportunities  and  related  terror  skills 
acquisition activities, and by the same token expanding the equivalent domestically-supported 
opportunities and activities.   
 
 
3. Econometric Method and Data 
The objective of this section is to present the dataset we put together to assess the empirical 
relevance of the escalation effect and discuss the econometric tools we chose to carry out this 
assessment. We test whether the escalation effect has empirical support using a unique panel data 
set with more than 130 countries,  yearly since 1968. Our preferred estimates are those from 
maximum likelihood negative binomial regressions.  
As dependent variables we use three different measures of international terrorism: the 
(absolute) number of attacks, the number of fatalities caused by these attacks and the number of 
fatalities  caused by  the  attack  of  median  intensity.  All three  measures  are obtained  for  each 
country-year pair. The data source for our terror indicators is the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge   13 
Base.
12  Each  country-year  combination  without  entry,  that  is,  in  which  no  terrorist  event  is 
recorded, is assigned a zero.  
The resulting count variables show a distribution which is strongly skewed. Moreover all 
three indicators exhibit significant over-dispersion, i.e., the variance is larger than the mean (see 
Table  2 for  sources  and  summary  statistics of  all  variables in  our analysis).  Over-dispersion 
makes  the  use  of  standard  estimation  methods  problematic.  More  specifically,  to  take  into 
account this feature of the data we use maximum-likelihood negative binomial regressions. In 
order to address the panel structure of our data, we use the conditional fixed effects negative 
binomial model. Let the expected value and the variance be given by: 
) ' ( ) (
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where yit is the count of the respective terror measure (total attacks, total fatalities, and median 
fatalities) in country i and year t, αi  are the  country specific effects and Xit is the vector of 
explanatory variables. The dispersion (i.e., variance divided by the mean) is given by ) 1 ( i d +  and 
is constant over time for each country. Following Hausman et al. (1984), if the joint probability is 
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then the conditional log likelihood function takes the following form:
13 
                                                 
12 See Sandler and Enders (2007) for a thorough discussion of the measurement of terrorism activity, in 
general, and Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MPIT) data in particular.   
13 For a discussion of the fixed effects negative binomial model, see also Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and 
Guimarães (2008).   14 
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where Γ is the gamma distribution. Notice that αi drops out by conditioning on the sum of the 
counts of the dependent variable. Consequently, all countries without any observed terrorism 
over the whole sample period are dropped from the estimation.
14 The coefficients can be obtained 
by standard maximization of the log likelihood. 
While our dependent variable is available for all country-year observations, this is not true 
for some of our explanatory variables. Thus our panel dataset is unbalanced and the number of 
observations also depends on the choice of explanatory variables. In order to minimize potential 
endogeneity problems, we lag all relevant explanatory variables by one year. To account for 
common shocks, we include yearly time dummies in all specifications. 
Our key variables are the various measures of domestic political instability and political 
violence that reflect the escalation effect. These include a dummy variable for the occurrence of 
civil war and a count variable for instances of guerrilla warfare. The source for the former is 
Gleditsch et al. (2002) and for the latter Databanks International (2005). Civil war takes on the 
value of one for years in which at least 1,000 deaths occur in battles between the government’s 
armed forces and opposition groups (without foreign intervention). Guerrilla warfare reflects the 
number of cases in which violence is used against the government by civilians aiming at the 
overthrow of the current regime.  
                                                 
14 This causes changes in the maximum number of countries we use for different dependent variables. Yet 
we have also estimated our regressions using the random effects negative binomial estimator (which does 
not drop the countries with zero terror events). The results are quantitatively the same and available upon 
request. Also notice that the number of countries dropped is relatively small.   15 
Other indicators of domestic political instability we use are the number of riots, strikes 
and  demonstrations  (all  from  Databanks  International,  2005).  Demonstrations  are  peaceful 
gatherings of at least 100 people voicing their disagreement with government policies, while riots 
are demonstrations which involve the use of force and violence. Finally, the definition of general 
strikes  require  the  involvement  of  a  minimum  of  1000  industrial  workers  of  more  than  one 
employer and are aimed at national policies and/or authorities. Additionally, we include regime 
duration which is measured as the number of years that the current political regime is in place. 
This data is available from Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
As  noted,  the  empirical  literature  on  the  causes  of  terrorism  has  highlighted  the 
importance of the political system. One well-established result is that of a non-linear relationship 
between  political  rights  and  terrorism.  However,  the  interpretation  of  the  magnitude  and 
significance  of  squared  terms  in  non-linear  estimations  such  as  the  negative  binomial  is  not 
straightforward (see, e.g., Ai and Norton, 2003). Thus, we model the potential non-linearity by 
including the lagged level of political freedom and its change in the regressions instead (as in 
Dreher and Gassebner, 2008). Political freedom is the average of the two indicators “political 
rights” and “civil liberties” provided by Freedom House (2005).
15  
Economic conditions have also received a great deal of attention in the empirical literature 
on the causes of terrorism. In all specifications we thus use real GDP per capita while we also 
include economic growth to test the robustness of our results (both measures are taken from 
World Bank, 2006). We address the hypothesis that the size of the country might determine how 
often terrorists strike by including population size, also taken from World Bank (2006). 
                                                 
15 Conceptually, these are different phenomena, but empirically their simple pair-wise correlation is high 
(0.98 in our data). Although we only report results for political freedom, we have also re-estimated all our 
models below using only political rights and only civil liberties and find that this does not affect our 
conclusions. These are available from the authors’ upon request.    16 
We employ five more control variables to assess the sensitiveness of our baseline results. 
The first is political proximity to the United States. Dreher and Gassebner (2008) show that being 
close to the U.S. triggers additional and more severe terror attacks. Proximity is measured from 
voting in the UN General Assembly and is taken from Voeten (2004). Thacker (1999) suggests 
that votes in line with the U.S. are coded 1, abstentions/absences are coded 0.5 and votes in 
opposition to the U.S. are coded 0. We obtain the proximity measure by dividing the resulting 
sums by the total number of votes for each country in each year. Hence, the variable ranges from 
zero to one, with one showing total agreement with the U.S. and zero, total disagreement.  
As can be seen from the plots of our terrorism measures (Figures 1 to 5), the occurrence 
of terror varies across regions. We take this into account by using the conditional fixed effects 
negative  binomial  estimator  and  also  by  including  an  OECD  membership  dummy  in  our 
regressions (data taken from the OECD webpage). 
From the discussion on the role of poverty and terrorism comes the notion that foreign aid 
might also be an important determinant of terror. However, the sign of the relationship is not 
straightforward. If poverty is a source of terrorism then (poverty-reducing) aid might be one way 
to counter terrorism. However, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Krueger and Laitin (2008) 
present evidence that terrorists are recruited from the middle classes. Azam and Delacroix, (2006) 
point out that aid could end up breeding additional terror attacks if it increases the ranks of the 
middle  class.
16  Our  aid  data  are  from  the  World  Bank  (2006)  and  includes  both  official 
development assistance (ODA) and official aid (measured as a share of GNI).  
The characteristics of potential target countries for terrorism play an important role thus 
we also include the urbanization rate. It might be more fruitful from a terrorist’s point of view to 
                                                 
16  “Some  use  this  as  an  argument  against  aid,  which  should  be  cut  because  it  would  increase  the 
probability of terrorist attacks, by increasing the supply of better off and educated people” (Azam and 
Delacroix, 2006, p.330).   17 
strike in urban areas. On the one hand, the population density and transportation infrastructure 
may increase the effectiveness of an attack. On the other hand, an attack in a large city benefits 
from  more  media  coverage  and  thus  the  attention  that  the  terror  group  receives.  Hence,  we 
include the share of urban population in our empirical setup (data are from World Bank, 2006). 
As  our  final  control  variable  we  introduce  trade  openness,  measured  as  imports  plus 
exports divided by GDP (from World Bank, 2006). As a proxy for globalization, the role of 
openness is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, strong ties to the world economy might provide 
incentives for national governments to engage in counter-terrorism activity as not to jeopardize 
its role in the world economy. On the other hand, increased exposure to foreign products, values 
and ideas might trigger hatred which could be channelled into terrorist activity. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The  first  column  of  Table  3  shows  a  parsimonious  model,  columns  2  to  7  each  adds  one 
additional control variable and the final column shows the full model, including all variables 
simultaneously.
17 The coefficients in all tables below represent incidence-rate ratios. As such, a 
one unit change in the corresponding variable represents an expected change in the terror variable 
of (coefficient minus 1) times 100 percent. Hence all values above 1 indicate a terror increasing 
relationship while the reverse holds for values below 1.   
Table 3 shows our results for the absolute number of transnational terror events as the 
dependent variable. Overall, we find strong support for the escalation effect. Civil wars, guerilla 
warfare and riots all exhibit the expected positive relationship and are  all statistically highly 
significant. All else equal, our model predicts that going from a situation of no civil war to a 
                                                 
17  Notice that the reported coefficients show how a change of x in t results in a change of y in t+1, as we 
lagged all but one of our regressors as indicated in the tables.    18 
situation of civil war would result in an increase in terror attacks by approximately 30 percent 
(e.g., for column 1: (1.3042 – 1) x 100 = 30.42 percent). The magnitude of the effect of guerilla 
attacks is almost identical: all else equal, increasing the number of guerilla incidences by 1 results 
in  roughly  30  percent  more  (international)  terror  events.  The  effect  of  riots  is  considerably 
smaller. One additional riot results in an increase of terror events by approximately 3.5 percent, 
an increase by one standard deviation (1.7) therefore causes a 6 percent increase in terror events. 
Moreover, we show that lesser forms of political violence, strikes and demonstrations, do not 
seem  to  help  explaining  the  occurrence  of  international  terrorism  which  is  in  line  with  our 
hypothesis. To put the magnitude of our results in perspective consider the number of events our 
model predicts. If we set the country fixed effects to zero, the predicted number of terror events 
range between 0.17 and 37.69 for the country-year observations. The average predicted number 
of international terror events for the estimation sample of column 1 is 0.95 as compared to the 
observed sample average of 2.18.  
Regarding our main control variables, most of our findings are in line with the previous 
literature. We find that per capita GDP is statistically insignificant in all specifications. More 
populous countries indeed seem to suffer more attacks. According to our fuller specification in 
column 8, one standard deviation increase in population size results in 44 percent additional 
terror events. Surprisingly, we find only limited support for a non-linear relationship between 
political freedoms and terror. While the level and the change variables have opposing signs, the 
latter  is  often  statistically  insignificant.  Moreover,  the  overall  effect  seems  to  be  of  lesser 
economic importance with the maximum being an increase of 12 percent in events for an increase 
of one point in political freedoms. For the full specification of column 8 both coefficients are 
insignificant. We have also estimated models without the rate of change and find that this does 
not affect our main results. Political stability, measured as the number of years the current regime   19 
is in place, seems to have a dampening effect on terror. The effect of additional one year of 
regime life is pretty small (especially when compared to say civil wars) and even an increase by 
one standard deviation (30 years) reduces attacks by just 24 percent. 
Turning to our additional covariates, there seems to be strong evidence on the roles of 
political proximity to the U.S., OECD membership and the urbanization rate. All of these three 
variables have the expected effects: changing the voting behavior from completely against the 
U.S. to completely in line would lead to more than a doubling of terror attacks. OECD countries 
experience on average 48 percent more attacks, while an increase of the urbanization rate by one 
standard deviation would result in a 23 percent increase. The growth rate of per capita GDP, 
foreign aid and economic openness do not exhibit a statistically significant relationship to terror 
attacks according to our results. 
Table 4 delves deeper into these issues by investigating whether regional differences are 
important. We find important differences in terms of which forms of domestic political instability 
play major roles in explaining the number of international terror acts across the different regions. 
Specifically, we find that in Asia civil war and riots are the main determinants of international 
terrorism acts, in the Americas that role is played by guerrilla warfare instead, for Africa it is 
played by riots, and for the Middle East we find it is a combination of civil wars and guerrilla 
warfare.
18 In the case of Europe, although we find that none of the violent forms of domestic 
political instability are related to the occurrence of terror acts, we uncover strong evidence that 
the duration of the political regime (a well-known measure of political instability) is negatively 
related to the occurrence of terrorist acts. Also note that these results maintain the differentials 
among the effects from the various political instability variables we find above. In particular, the 
                                                 
18  Notice  that  at  times  the  negative  binomial  estimator  converges  only  by  dropping  some  of  the 
explanatory variables from the estimation (for instance, for the Africa and Middle East regressions above 
the dummy for OECD is dropped.)    20 
effects of riots tend to be considerably smaller than those from civil wars and guerrilla warfare. 
Although one additional riot generates 10 percent more international terrorist acts in Asia and 25 
percent more in Africa, these pale in comparison to the effects of the other variables (for instance, 
we estimate that civil war occurrence in Asia increase the number of terror acts by slightly more 
than 80 percent.) 
Columns 6 to 9 in Table 4 present similar specifications but now splitting the sample 
according to level of per capita GDP (based on the World Bank classification into high, upper-
middle, lower-middle and low income groups from Easterly and Sewadeh, 2001).  Here again we 
uncover  some  interesting  differences.  Starting  with  the  high  income  countries,  we  find  that 
domestic political  instability  in terms  of  shorter  regime  duration and the  occurrence  of  anti-
government  demonstrations  both  are  associated  with  an  (relatively  small  but  statistically 
significant) increase in the number of international terror events. On the other hand, we find that 
civil war and riots are consistently important predictors of the number of terror acts in the lower, 
lower-middle and upper-middle per capita income groups, with the larger effects observed for the 
upper-middle income countries (the occurrence of civil war increases the number of terror acts in 
upper-middle income countries by almost 90 percent while riots generates a similar increase of 
12 percent.) We estimate that the effects of guerrilla warfare tend to be significant only for the 
middle-income  countries.  These  effects  are  also  large  with,  for  instance,  the  occurrence  of 
guerrilla warfare in a lower-middle income country generating an almost 60 percent increase in 
the number of international terrorism events. Finally, with respect to general strikes, we find that 
they tend to increase the number of terror acts for lower-middle income countries (one additional 
strike  generating  about  14  percent  more  international  terror  events)  but  seems  to  have  the 
opposite effect for upper-middle income countries (in light of the results above suggesting that   21 
the Asian countries may be playing a large role in this effect).
19  
Table 5 furthers this analysis by focusing on fatalities caused by international terrorism, 
instead of the absolute number of terror attacks (that is, we look at the severity of terror rather 
than just its occurrence). With respect to our key variables, the overall pattern is similar to the 
one obtained before. Both the occurrence of civil war and guerilla warfare robustly increases the 
number of international terror casualties. Indeed, the magnitude of these two effects is higher 
than for the occurrence of terror: the number of terror fatalities increases by roughly 50 percent 
due to the presence of civil war and more than 60 percent for one (additional) act of guerrilla 
warfare.
20  
Of the other political instability variables, riots are only significant for the most complete 
specification in column 8 and only at the 10% level. The estimated effect has almost the same 
magnitude as before. Demonstrations, on the other hand, seem to matter more (significant in 6 
out of the 8 regressions) but are not significant in our complete specification. As before, strikes 
seem to be seldom important vis-à-vis international terrorism activity.  
As for our other covariates, most our previous findings prevail. Thus, the determinants of 
terrorism as such (the intensive margin) also seem to matter in determining its severity. There are 
a  few  exceptions  worth  noting.  It  seems  that  richer  countries  suffer  from  more  fatal  attacks 
(despite not facing more terror overall): In 6 out of the 8 regressions GDP per capita is positive 
                                                 
19  We  have  also  split  the  sample  along  the  lines  of  the  extent  of  political  freedom,  using  the  three 
categories proposed by Freedom House, namely free, partly-free and not free. Interestingly, we find that 
the effects of civil wars and general strikes are much larger in the countries classified as not free, while the 
effects of guerrilla warfare are more important in the partly-free countries. We believe future research 
would benefit from studying in details the effects of a wider number of features of democratic regimes.  
20 If we include civil war or guerrilla warfare as the only escalation variable, the respective coefficient 
increases both in size and significance (indeed, up to a doubling of the civil war coefficient). Results are 
available upon request. We have also experimented with a principal component index and the results are 
equally supportive of the escalation effect, with the resulting coefficient also being larger in magnitude 
than the single coefficients.   22 
and significant. Yet, further examination reveals that this effect seems driven by urbanization as 
in  those  specifications  where  the  urbanization  rate  is  included  this  per  capita  GDP  effect 
vanishes. Moreover, in our complete specification in column 8, the effect is terror dampening and 
significant at the 5 % level. Thus richer countries suffer fewer fatalities, but more urbanized 
countries do suffer more casualties. The corresponding changes in fatalities due to one standard 
deviation  are  -32  percent  (GDP  per  capita)  and  68  percent  (urbanization).  Moreover,  the 
magnitude of the proximity to the U.S. effect  is much larger for terror fatalities: completely 
moving  towards  the  U.S.  form  an  initial  situation  of  complete  objection  would  increase  the 
number of victims by a factor of 10.
21 All other results are comparable in magnitude with our 
previous findings. 
We also use the number of casualties at the attack of median intensity as our dependent 
variable in Table 6 as this helps to minimize the effects of outliers. The findings do not change 
with respect  to  guerilla  warfare,  which  continues  to  be  highly  statistically significant  and  of 
similar magnitude as above. However, while the magnitude of the civil war variable also seems 
unchanged,  it  becomes  marginally  insignificant  (p-value  of  0.105)  in  our  full  specification 
(column 8), and statistically significant only in 5 out of 8 specifications. Otherwise, we obtain 
very  similar  findings,  except  that  the  role  of  political  freedom  declines  even  further  but  the 
change becomes marginally significant for the full specification, providing support to the notion 
that  political  liberalization  may  decrease  fatalities  at  the  median  event.  The  role  of  regime 
stability and political proximity seems to be much larger and the finding that urbanization rather 
than per capita GDP matters also received further confirmation. 
We  subjected  the  results  above  to  a  wide  array  of  tests  of  robustness.  As  the  main 
                                                 
21 While this effect might seem enormous, it is important to keep in mind that maximum and minimum of 
the variable are 0.06 and 0.84 while the standard deviation is 0.14.   23 
conclusion from these is that they do not change our findings, the estimates are not presented for 
the sake of space but are available upon request. First, given the attention paid to the potential 
role of democracy in driving terror, we test whether our results are affected if we use different 
measures of political freedom. As an alternative to the Freedom House indicators we employ the 
Polity  IV  score  from  Marshall  and  Jaggers  (2002).  This  leaves  all  our  findings  unchanged. 
Second, we check whether our results are driven by the 9/11 event and its aftermath by rerunning 
our estimations until only the year 2000. Notice that splitting the sample in this manner also 
addresses the issue of the potential role of anti-terror measures (as such expenditures and policies 
have increased and spread substantially following 9/11). This also has no effects whatsoever on 
our findings. Third, we tested whether or not the importance of the escalation effect has increased 
since 1968. We find it did as the interaction terms between a time trend and either civil wars or 
guerrilla warfare turns out always to be positive and significant.
22 Yet, Ai and Norton (2003) 
show that the interpretation of interaction terms is quite cumbersome in non-linear estimation 
models.  Therefore,  we  run  rolling  regressions.  As  an  example  we  show  the  results  for  the 
coefficient on guerrilla warfare when regressed on the number of terror fatalities. Our rolling 
windows are 15 years wide and move forward by one year for each regression. Thus the first 
regression covers the years 1973-1987 and final regression the years 1989-2003. In total this 
procedure yields 16 regressions. As the results presented in Figure 6 show, there is a stable yet 
clear upward trend in the relationship between guerrilla warfare and terrorism suggesting indeed 
that the importance of this explanation has not decreased over time.
23 Fourth, we test whether our 
results simply pick up regional rather than domestic instability. To do so we add annual regional 
averages of our two central variables, civil war and guerrilla warfare, to the regressions. To avoid 
                                                 
22 This may not be entirely unexpected in light of the fact that state sponsored terrorism has rescinded 
since the end of the Cold War. 
23 Figure 6 only serves as an example with other setups yielding comparable results.   24 
double counting, we always exclude the country in question. The results show that this does not 
affect our findings while the regional averages themselves are mostly insignificant. 
In order to further investigate whether our results are affected by outliers, we construct a 
dummy variable which takes on the value 1 for positive outcomes of each of our terror indicators. 
We  then  run  conditional  fixed  effects  logit  regressions  (see  Chamberlain,  1980),  that  is,  we 
examine the probability of experiencing terrorism. We find the escalation effect also holds strong 
in such a less rich empirical setup. 
One  final  objection that  could  be raised  is  that  our  results  might suffer  from  reverse 
causality. To address this concern we employ maximum likelihood instrumental variables probit 
estimations with standard errors clustered at the country level. Again, our dependent variables are 
dummy variables as described above. To instrument our escalation variables we use the variables 
ethnic  tension  and  religious  tension  taken  from  the International  Country  Risk  Guide.  These 
variables  measure  the  degree  of  tensions  within  a  country  which  is  attributable  to  racial, 
nationality  or  language  divisions  and  religious  divisions,  respectively.  While  our  findings 
regarding the escalation effect do not change, the Wald test for exogeneity shows that our central 
variables are not endogenous to terror.
24  
 
5. Conclusions  
Using data on various aspects of international terrorist events (total number of terror events, event 
occurrence, total fatalities and fatalities at the median event) covering more than 130 countries, 
yearly from 1968 onwards, our main findings are that (i) civil wars and guerrilla warfare are 
robustly associated with international terror, while riots and strikes are not, and this association is 
                                                 
24 The null hypothesis of the Wald test is that the regressors are exogenous. We always fail to reject it, 
e.g., for Civil War the p-values are 0.23 and 0.10 (for terrorism events and fatalities, respectively), while 
they are 0.49 and 0.20 for guerrilla warfare.   25 
stronger for  fatalities than for the number of attacks (that is, we find strong support for the 
escalation  effect),
  (ii)  the  explanatory  power  of  escalation  seems  to  increase  over  time,  (iii) 
somewhat in line with previous research, per capita GDP and foreign aid are not robust factors in 
explaining international terrorism,  and (iv) there is evidence that OECD membership (or being a 
rich country) is a less important factor than ideological proximity to the U.S.  
On the basis of these  results, we  argue for the importance of the escalation effect in 
understanding international terrorism and suggest for future research more efforts to uncover the 
main mechanisms through which it operates. Our main conjecture is that domestic instability 
escalates into international terrorism because it provides and perfects the skills (military, strategic 
and  organizational)  required  to  carry  out  international  terrorist  acts.  One  example  may  help 
underscore the importance of this potential mechanism. In July 2005, the London public transport 
system suffered two terrorist attacks. The first, in July 7, unfortunately succeeded but the other, 
two weeks later (July 21), failed. There are many differences between the two events but an 
examination of the biographies of the two teams of perpetrators reveals one important distinction: 
the  members  of  the  first  group  seem  to  have  received  substantially  more  training  and  have 
received it much closer in time to the attack than those in the second group (Krueger, 2007, p.48).
  
  In terms of the policy lessons our analysis offer, it follows from our findings that one 
crucial goal of anti-terrorism policy must be the containment of violent conflict around the globe 
(Collier et al., 2008). However, recent experience suggests that direct military intervention can be 
counter-productive,
25  while  foreign  aid  might  be  effective  in  the  medium-  to  long-term.
26 
Moreover, from the conflict literature we learn that factors such as inequality, political rights, 
ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization are not good predictors of civil wars and hence 
                                                 
25 See Axelrod and Borzutzky (2006). 
26 See also Frey and Luechinger (2003) for a discussion on alternatives to deterrence as a way to fight 
terrorism.   26 
can not be counted on to counter transnational terrorism (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). However, 
one of the main factors identified as causing conflict is the availability of finance. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) find that income from commodity exports is one of the main determinants of 
conflict.  In  this  light,  a  medium  to  long-term  policy  implication  would  be  to  diversify  the 
economy so that there is less dependence on commodities. Moreover, the close monitoring of 
world  wide  financing  operations  might  be  an  important  way  to  counter  terrorism.  Another, 
unrelated, policy suggestion we offer is for further investments in technology (Crenshaw, 2006; 
Cragin  et  al.,  2007).  Investment  is  needed  to  close  the  gap  between  what  is  technologically 
feasible  and  the  effective  disruption  and  containment  of  the  activities  of  terrorist  groups 
worldwide. In this light, we take inspiration from the defining effects of Ronald Reagan 1983’s 
“Strategic Defense Initiative” (the “Star Wars” program) on subsequent Cold War events and 
recommend a similar containment tool: frontier technological investment that aim at yielding 
innovations  that  facilitate  international  coordination  and  are  able  to  radically  minimize  the 
probability of further and more sophisticated transnational terror attacks.     27 
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Figure 2.  
Average Number (per Country) of International Terrorist Events and Fatalities in the Middle East 
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Figure 3.  
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Figure 5. 
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Note: This figure shows the outcome of rolling regressions of the specification presented in Table 5, column 1. The 
dependent variable is terror fatalities and the rolling windows are for 15 years. Hence the first regression covers 
1973-1987 and the last regression 1989-2003. It depicts the incidence-rate ratio and the 90 %-confidence interval.   34 
 
Table 1.  
What do we Know About The Causes of International Terrorism? 
An Overview of the Cross-Country Econometric Evidence 
 
STUDY  Max No. of countries 
Estimation (main) 
Panel or cross-section 
 
Terror measure    Main  
determinants 





Weinberg and Eubank  
1998 
175      Chi-square test 
Cross-section 
No. attacks   Democracy; Transition to 
and away from democracy 
None  No 
Eubank and Weinberg 
2001 
 175      Chi-square test 
Cross-section 
No. attacks   Stable Democracy   None  No 
Krueger and  Maleckova 
2003 
148   Negative binomial 
Cross-section 
  No. attacks   Population  (country size); 
civil liberties 
GDP per capita; 
Illiteracy 
No 
Blomberg et al. 
 2004 
 127       ML Markov 
Panel 
No. attacks   Democracy; GDP per 
capita; GDP contractions 
None  No 
Li and Schaub  
2004 
 112   Negative binomial  
Panel 
  No. attacks   GDP per capita; Trade 
partners’ GDP per capita 





not reported         OLS 
Panel 
No. attacks per 
capita  
GDP , growth, diversity, 
illiteracy; % urban 
Political rights; primary 




 119   Negative binomial 
Panel 
No. attacks   Democracy;  Gov 
capability; regime durable  
Press freedom; Interstate 





 169              OLS 
        Cross-section 
WMRC Global 
Terrorism Index 
(Nonlinear) Pol Rights; ling 
diversity;  unemployment   
GDP per capita; Gini; HDI  No 
Abadie  
2006 




(Nonlinear) Pol Rights; ling 
diversity; geography   
GDP per capita; Gini; HDI  No 
Azam and Delacroix 
 2006 
 178   Negative Binomial   
Cross-section 
No. attacks   Aid; Population 
(nonlinear); GDP per capita 
None  No 
Blomberg and Rosendorff 
2006 
 189              Tobit 
Panel 
No. attacks   Democracy; GDP per 
capita; Openness; Distance 
IMF and WTO membership  No 
 Bravo and Dias  
2006 
   85                       OLS 
Cross-section 
No. attacks   Democracy; natural 
resources; illiteracy  
Muslim population; trade 
openness 




 111  Negative binomial 
Panel 
No. attacks   Welfare exp; Democracy; 





Freytag et al. 
 2006 
 71     Negative Binomial   
Cross-section 
  No. attacks 
(ITC) 
Population; quality of 
(economic) institutions    
 GDP per capita; trade 
openness; Gini; Muslin  
No 
Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 
2006 
121             Logit 
Cross-section 
No. attacks   Democracy; GDP per 
capita; ethno-ling fract 
Economic Freedom Indexes 









diversity; Pol Rights (CL) 





193    Negative binomial 
Panel 
No. attacks   War;  Democracy; GDP per 
capita; Civil war 
None  Yes (failed 
state) 
Basuchoudhary and 
Shughart   2007 
 118   Negative binomial 
Panel 
No. attacks   Ethnic fract; Institutions;  Political freedom plus civil 
liberties   
No 
Azam and Thelen 
2008 
176    Negative Binomial   
Cross-section 
No. attacks   GDP per capita; Aid; 
Education 
Population  No 
Berman and Laitin  
2008 
161                   OLS 
Cross-section 
Suicide attacks  None  GDP per capita; geography 
(mountains) 
No 
Blomberg and Hess  
2008a 
114                   Tobit 
Panel 
No. attacks   GDP per capita; GDP; 
Trade openness 
Education; Language fract; 
Religious fract 
No 
Blomberg and Hess  
2008b 
189                  Tobit 
Panel 
No. attacks   Democracy; GDP; Trade 
Openness; Distance 
WTO membership;  
Area 
No 
Dreher and Gassebner 
2008 
 116   Negative Binomial 
Panel 
No. attacks   Political freedom;  
Voting with U.S. 
GDP (growth and level);  No 
Dreher and Fischer  
2008 
109  Negative Binomial 
Panel  
No. attacks   Fiscal decentralization; 
political freedom 
GDP (growth and level); 
war; govt fract; ELF  
No 
Feldman and Ruffle 
2008 
109    Negative Binomial 
Panel 
No. fatalities    Religious terror group  Ethno and religious fract; 
Muslim; Civil liberties  
No 
Krueger and Laitin  
2008 
150    Negative binomial 
Cross-section 
  No. attacks   Population;  civil liberties; 
(PI for suicide attacks) 
GDP (level and growth);  PI 
for all  
Yes    
Sambanis 
2008 
133    Multinomial Logit 
Cross-section 
No. attacks   Ethno-ling fract; 
Population;  Democracy 
Oil exports;  
per capita GDP  
No   36 
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Sources 
 
Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Terror Events MIPT 2.18 6.21 0 151
Terror Fatalities MIPT 3.12 53.16 0 2982
Median Fatalities MIPT 0.62 8.25 0 291
Political Freedom Freedom House (2005) 3.80 1.96 -7 -1
Political Freedom, change Freedom House (2005) 0.03 0.47 -4.5 4
GDP p.c. World Bank (2006) 5599.6 8132.2 56.52 50621
Population World Bank (2006) 4.1E+07 1.3E+08 360849 1.3E+09
Regime duration Maeshall and Jaggers (2002) 23.73 30.26 0 193
Civil War Gleditsch et al. (2002) 0.06 0.23 0 1
Strikes Databanks International (2005) 0.18 0.60 0 7
Guerilla Warfare Databanks International (2005) 0.16 0.42 0 3
Riots Databanks International (2005) 0.46 1.70 0 26
Demonstrations Databanks International (2005) 0.69 1.80 0 26
Political proximity to U.S.Voeten (2004) 0.29 0.14 0.06 0.84
GDP growth p.c  World Bank (2006) 1.39 6.11 -50.5 89.8
Aid World Bank (2006) 4.64 7.68 -0.7 98.5
OECD dummy OECD webpage 0.21 0.41 0 1
Urbanization World Bank (2006) 50.88 23.93 2.9 100.0
Openness World Bank (2006) 67.71 36.85 6.3 398.8 
Notes: The summary statistics were calculated base on the estimation sample of Table 3 column 1, with a 
maximum of 3447 observations.   37 
Table 3: Determinants of International Terror Events (Absolute Number), Developing and Developed 
Countries, 1972-2003, Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Panel Estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Political Freedom, t-1 1.1042 1.0450 1.1090 1.0709 1.1054 1.0814 1.1207 1.0285
(3.82)*** (1.47) (3.96)*** (2.56)** (3.69)*** (2.97)*** (4.27)*** (0.88)
Political Freedom, change 0.9831 0.9797 0.9903 0.9633 0.9677 0.9707 0.9752 0.9410
(0.32) (0.36) (0.18) (0.70) (0.60) (0.56) (0.46) (1.03)
GDP p.c., t-1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(1.56) (1.01) (1.60) (0.36) (1.53) (0.41) (1.29) (0.97)
Population, t-1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(2.46)** (2.45)** (2.73)*** (2.10)** (2.48)** (2.77)*** (2.55)** (2.43)**
Regime duration, t-1 0.9938 0.9909 0.9934 0.9939 0.9940 0.9940 0.9941 0.9919
(3.67)*** (3.47)*** (3.85)*** (3.61)*** (3.34)*** (3.55)*** (3.39)*** (2.54)**
Civil War, t-1 1.3042 1.2653 1.3207 1.3275 1.3170 1.3395 1.3371 1.3387
(2.80)*** (2.40)** (2.90)*** (2.98)*** (2.84)*** (3.07)*** (3.02)*** (2.85)***
Strikes, t-1 0.9785 0.9688 0.9907 0.9864 0.9776 0.9671 0.9805 0.9641
(0.64) (0.82) (0.27) (0.40) (0.64) (0.98) (0.58) (0.90)
Guerilla Warfare, t-1 1.3109 1.3136 1.3049 1.2584 1.2947 1.3098 1.2975 1.2705
(5.16)*** (4.78)*** (5.05)*** (4.29)*** (4.85)*** (5.19)*** (4.90)*** (4.05)***
Riots, t-1 1.0344 1.0462 1.0342 1.0328 1.0371 1.0343 1.0339 1.0484
(2.77)*** (2.97)*** (2.79)*** (2.66)*** (3.00)*** (2.80)*** (2.71)*** (3.11)***
Demonstrations, t-1 1.0198 0.9852 1.0229 1.0220 1.0304 1.0177 1.0219 0.9984
(1.42) (0.88) (1.65)* (1.59) (2.16)** (1.27) (1.57) (0.09)
Political proximity to U.S. 3.2887 2.1688
(2.76)*** (1.65)*
GDP growth p.c , t-1 1.0037 1.0022
(0.83) (0.46)
OECD dummy, t-1 1.8189 1.4823
(4.14)*** (2.41)**
Aid, t-1 1.0020 1.0037
(0.38) (0.65)
Urbanization, t-1 1.0102 1.0097
(3.48)*** (2.84)***
Openness, t-1 1.0013 1.0013
(0.90) (0.81)
Observations 3447 3033 3419 3447 3321 3447 3315 2822
Countries 132 122 132 132 130 132 128 119 
 
Notes: The results are based on conditional fixed effect negative binomial. All specifications include annual year 
dummies. The coefficients given in the table are incidence-rate ratios, i.e., values greater than 1 indicate an 
expected increase in terror events due to an increase in the respective variable while values smaller than 1 
indicate a reduction. 
*/**/***  indicate  significance  at  the  10/5/1-\%  level;  absolute  value  of  z-statistic  is  given  in  parentheses.  38 
Table 4: Determinants of International Terror Events (Absolute Number), By Region and Income 
Groups, 1972-2003, Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Panel Estimates 
 
Region / Income Group Asia Europe Americas Middle East Africa low lwr middle upr middle high
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Political Freedom, t-1 1.0735 0.9370 1.0933 1.3445 0.8168 0.8716 1.0605 1.1723 0.9971
(0.72) (0.73) (1.57) (2.42)** (1.64) (1.72)* (1.04) (2.40)** (0.04)
Political Freedom, change 1.0069 0.6629 1.0421 1.3574 0.9497 1.0099 0.8343 1.1445 0.8484
(0.05) (2.33)** (0.47) (1.66)* (0.29) (0.09) (1.87)* (1.23) (0.97)
GDP p.c., t-1 0.9999 1.0001 0.9999 1.0000 1.0006 1.0023 0.9998 0.9998 1.0000
(1.41) (1.51) (1.39) (0.75) (1.25) (3.88)*** -0.94 (3.77)*** -1.6
Population, t-1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(1.45) (1.04) (0.27) (0.90) (4.26)*** (4.58)*** (2.93)*** (0.12) (1.66)*
Regime duration, t-1 0.9621 0.9814 1.0081 1.0076 0.9436 0.9385 0.9961 1.0325 0.9940
(3.32)*** (1.98)** (1.34) (0.91) (3.70)*** (6.30)*** (0.68) (4.49)*** (1.73)*
Civil War, t-1 1.8410 1.2774 1.1790 1.8484 1.5793 1.5124 1.3617 1.8897
(2.77)*** (0.92) (0.99) (1.69)* (1.58) (2.06)** (2.29)** (1.89)*
Strikes, t-1 0.7897 0.9411 1.0154 1.1030 0.8561 0.8703 1.1345 0.7758 1.0214
(2.27)** (0.63) (0.23) (1.00) (0.64) (1.41) (1.83)* (2.59)*** (0.32)
Guerilla Warfare, t-1 0.9974 1.1885 1.5968 1.6010 1.0271 1.1129 1.5845 1.5191 0.9562
(0.02) (1.13) (4.50)*** (2.44)** (0.14) (1.04) (4.83)*** (2.96)*** (0.34)
Riots, t-1 1.1043 0.9808 1.0846 1.0252 1.2519 1.1064 1.0600 1.1258 1.0055
(3.89)*** (0.64) (1.41) (0.46) (2.02)** (4.07)*** (1.84)* (3.02)*** (0.27)
Demonstrations, t-1 0.9970 1.0425 1.0380 0.9146 0.8664 0.9718 0.9546 1.0753 1.0408
(0.09) (1.11) (1.07) (1.64) (1.17) (0.94) (1.69)* (2.38)** (1.80)*
Political proximity to U.S. 0.2445 2.4269 0.0387 0.1625 0.8469 3.1390
(0.56) (0.80) (2.34)** (0.82) (0.14) (1.02)
GDP growth p.c , t-1 1.0486 1.0080 1.0007 0.9918 1.0009 0.9950 1.0102 1.0053 1.0228
(1.82)* (0.99) (0.05) (0.83) (0.08) (0.50) (1.44) (0.64) (0.99)
OECD dummy, t-1 3.0138 0.3557 0.4088
(1.27) (2.02)** (1.13)
Aid, t-1 1.0198 1.0222 0.9939 1.0474 1.0130 1.0037 1.0096 1.1421
(0.42) (1.53) (0.44) (2.50)** (1.29) (0.45) (0.78) (1.72)*
Urbanization, t-1 1.0624 1.0141 1.0092 1.0408 0.9939 1.0231 0.9991 1.0172
(3.57)*** (1.01) (0.93) (1.76)* (0.36) (2.40)** (0.07) (1.44)
Openness, t-1 0.9900 0.9969 0.9969 1.0007 1.0002 1.0062 0.9931 0.9924
(1.49) (0.84) (0.75) (0.13) (0.06) (1.84)* (1.84)* (1.55)
Observations 453 593 622 388 785 1026 810 531 651
Countries 18 34 21 15 31 43 37 22 21 
 
Notes: The results are based on conditional fixed effect negative binomial. All specifications include annual year 
dummies. The coefficients given in the table are incidence-rate ratios, i.e., values greater than 1 indicate an 
expected increase in terror events due to an increase in the respective variable while values smaller than 1 
indicate a reduction. The region and income group classification is taken from Easterly and Sewadeh (2001). 
This table reports our attempts to fit the full specification from column 8 in Table 3 to various split samples. The 
variables for which no coefficients are reported (e.g., OECD dummy for the Middle East in column 4) were 
dropped in the estimation so as to allow the estimates to convergence.  
*/**/***  indicate  significance  at  the  10/5/1-\%  level;  absolute  value  of  z-statistic  is  given  in  parentheses.  39 
Table  5:  Determinants  of  International  Terror  Events  (Number  of  Fatalities),  Developing  and 
Developed Countries, 1972-2003, Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Panel Estimates 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Political Freedom, t-1 1.1391 1.0938 1.1415 1.0825 1.1356 1.0622 1.1381 0.9869
(3.83)*** (2.29)** (3.83)*** (2.12)** (3.62)*** (1.75)* (3.72)*** (0.31)
Political Freedom, change 0.9321 0.9184 0.9528 0.9072 0.9256 0.8893 0.9196 0.8729
(0.82) (0.95) (0.56) (1.13) (0.89) (1.36) (0.97) (1.51)
GDP p.c., t-1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999
(4.43)*** (3.04)*** (4.27)*** (2.84)*** (3.81)*** (0.56) (4.38)*** (2.05)**
Population, t-1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(0.31) (0.15) (0.35) (0.01) (0.88) (1.65)* (0.62) (0.56)
Regime duration, t-1 0.9900 0.9873 0.9899 0.9890 0.9905 0.9907 0.9898 0.9908
(5.33)*** (3.48)*** (5.29)*** (5.74)*** (4.85)*** (4.88)*** (5.32)*** (2.16)**
Civil War, t-1 1.4741 1.4818 1.4973 1.4727 1.4650 1.6271 1.4451 1.5405
(2.83)*** (2.80)*** (2.91)*** (2.83)*** (2.76)*** (3.55)*** (2.64)*** (2.99)***
Strikes, t-1 1.0320 0.9606 1.0487 1.0503 1.0530 0.9778 1.0280 0.9471
(0.59) (0.68) (0.89) (0.92) (0.97) (0.42) (0.52) (0.89)
Guerilla Warfare, t-1 1.5896 1.7267 1.5826 1.5658 1.5915 1.5807 1.5972 1.7408
(5.78)*** (6.34)*** (5.67)*** (5.59)*** (5.76)*** (5.84)*** (5.82)*** (6.50)***
Riots, t-1 0.9945 1.0301 0.9933 0.9932 0.9951 1.0030 0.9936 1.0454
(0.27) (1.25) (0.34) (0.34) (0.24) (0.15) (0.31) (1.90)*
Demonstrations, t-1 1.0659 1.0309 1.0694 1.0698 1.0731 1.0459 1.0660 1.0180
(3.14)*** (1.17) (3.30)*** (3.34)*** (3.46)*** (2.18)** (3.12)*** (0.65)
Political proximity to U.S. 11.0910 10.2237
(4.42)*** (3.96)***
GDP growth p.c , t-1 1.0043 1.0042
(0.65) (0.60)
OECD dummy, t-1 1.8944 1.7778
(3.37)*** (2.68)***
Aid, t-1 0.9884 1.0002
(1.41) (0.02)
Urbanization, t-1 1.0255 1.0284
(7.73)*** (7.16)***
Openness, t-1 0.9982 0.9972
(1.11) (1.51)
Observations 2885 2502 2860 2885 2747 2885 2787 2335
Countries 107 97 107 107 103 107 104 94 
 
Notes: The results are based on conditional fixed effect negative binomial. All specifications include annual year 
dummies. The coefficients given in the table are incidence-rate ratios, i.e., values greater than 1 indicate an 
expected increase in terror fatalities due to an increase in the respective variable while values smaller than 1 
indicate a reduction.. 
*/**/***  indicate  significance  at  the  10/5/1-\%  level;  absolute  value  of  z-statistic  is  given  in  parentheses.  40 
Table 6: Determinants of International Terror Events (Median Severity International Terror Event), 
Developing and Developed Countries, 1972-2003, Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Panel Estimates 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Political Freedom, t-1 1.0598 1.0261 1.0700 1.0608 1.0817 1.0234 1.0700 0.9836
(1.21) (0.47) (1.38) (1.11) (1.56) (0.48) (1.37) (0.26)
Political Freedom, change 0.8594 0.8357 0.8514 0.8598 0.8445 0.8376 0.8392 0.7875
(1.30) (1.50) (1.35) (1.29) (1.43) (1.49) (1.50) (1.91)*
GDP p.c., t-1 1.0000 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9999
(2.45)** (2.75)*** (1.95)* (2.36)** (2.45)** (0.49) (2.56)** (0.12)
Population, t-1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(1.37) (2.44)** (1.35) (1.36) (1.18) (2.33)** (1.10) (2.73)***
Regime duration, t-1 0.9863 0.9814 0.9871 0.9863 0.9858 0.9849 0.9852 0.9740
(4.06)*** (3.47)*** (3.72)*** (3.65)*** (4.05)*** (4.35)*** (4.26)*** (4.12)***
Civil War, t-1 1.4144 1.5094 1.3486 1.4149 1.4316 1.5221 1.3365 1.4058
(1.79)* (2.08)** (1.52) (1.79)* (1.84)* (2.15)** (1.46) (1.62)
Strikes, t-1 0.9961 0.9279 0.9935 0.9961 1.0141 0.9644 0.9850 0.9099
(0.04) (0.68) (0.06) (0.04) (0.14) (0.36) (0.15) (0.83)
Guerilla Warfare, t-1 1.5821 1.5344 1.6063 1.5822 1.6176 1.5948 1.6201 1.5799
(3.81)*** (3.40)*** (3.91)*** (3.80)*** (3.97)*** (3.91)*** (4.01)*** (3.62)***
Riots, t-1 0.9563 0.9768 0.9572 0.9563 0.9515 0.9635 0.9571 0.9837
(1.23) (0.62) (1.22) (1.23) (1.35) (1.02) (1.21) (0.42)
Demonstrations, t-1 1.0859 1.0606 1.0845 1.0858 1.0962 1.0726 1.0834 1.0511
(2.42)** (1.48) (2.38)** (2.41)** (2.68)*** (2.04)** (2.32)** (1.19)
Political proximity to U.S. 28.0038 49.8017
(4.07)*** (4.30)***
GDP growth p.c , t-1 0.9936 0.9974
(0.70) (0.28)
OECD dummy, t-1 0.9833 2.0940
(0.04) (1.28)
Aid, t-1 1.0052 1.0062
(0.51) (0.57)
Urbanization, t-1 1.0228 1.0309
(4.40)*** (4.85)***
Openness, t-1 0.9976 0.9918
(1.03) (2.94)***
Observations 2633 2289 2607 2633 2495 2633 2535 2123
Countries 98 89 97 98 94 98 95 86 
 
Notes: The results are based on conditional fixed effect negative binomial. All specifications include annual year 
dummies. The coefficients given in the table are incidence-rate ratios, i.e., values greater than 1 indicate an 
expected increase in the number of fatalities at the median event due to an increase in the respective variable 
while values smaller than 1 indicate a reduction.. 












   